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Abstract
This study examines the impact of increased transparency, brought about by the introduction of
three electronic trading systems, on the brokered interdealer market for Government of Canada
benchmark securities. Using the CanPX dataset for the 2-, 5-, 10-, and 30-year benchmarks, the
paper ﬁnds some evidence of decreased bid-ask spreads for the 30-year benchmark in the months
following the introduction of the electronic platforms. Bid-ask spreads are not signiﬁcantly
different in the pre- and post-transparency periods for the 2-, 5- or 10-year benchmarks. The
price-impact coefﬁcient, calculated using dollar value as a measure of order ﬂow, also decreased
in the post-event period for the 30-year benchmark but is not statistically different for any of the
other benchmarks. Overall, there is little evidence that liquidity improved or was lowered by the
introduction of the electronic systems.
JEL classiﬁcation: G10, G14
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial markets; Market structure and pricing
Résumé
L’auteure examine l’incidence que la hausse de la transparence due à l’implantation de trois
systèmes de négociation électroniques a eue sur le marché intercourtiers des titres de référence du
gouvernement canadien. D’après les données de CanPX relatives aux obligations de référence à 2,
5, 10 et 30 ans, les écarts entre les cours acheteur et vendeur des obligations à 30 ans ont diminué
dans les mois qui ont suivi la mise en place des plateformes électroniques; toutefois, l’avènement
de celles-ci n’a pas eu d’effet notable sur les écarts acheteur-vendeur des obligations des
trois autres échéances. Même constat pour le coefﬁcient qui sert à quantiﬁer l’incidence du ﬂux
d’ordres (mesuré en dollars) sur les prix : il a baissé dans le cas des obligations à 30 ans, mais il
n’est signiﬁcativement différent pour aucune des autres échéances. Somme toute, il y a peu
d’indices que l’introduction de systèmes électroniques ait entraîné une amélioration ou une
détérioration de la liquidité.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G10, G14
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Marchés ﬁnanciers; Structure de marché et ﬁxation des prix1 
1. Introduction and Motivation 
 
This paper studies the impact of increased transparency in the Government of Canada bond market, brought 
about by the introduction of electronic trading platforms. Transparency refers to the degree to which 
information about trading activity, both before a trade occurs (pre-trade) and after a trade occurs (post-
trade), is publicly available. Pre-trade transparency refers to the visibility of the best price at which any 
incoming order can potentially be executed, while post-trade transparency refers to the public visibility of 
the recent trading history in terms of traded price or volume or both.  
The appropriate level of transparency in fixed-income markets has been the subject of recent policy debates 
globally.
1 Central to the transparency debate is the theoretical relationship between transparency and 
liquidity. For most markets greater transparency of trading information is thought to improve price 
discovery, promote market efficiency, and increase investor confidence which encourages greater investor 
participation leading to greater liquidity (International Organization of Securities Commissions, 2004).   
However, for dealership markets the relationship between transparency and liquidity is complex.  If 
increased transparency forces market makers to make their trades public before they have had time to 
unwind or hedge their inventory positions, it will increase the risk that the positions will be unwound at a 
loss. This increased risk will increase trading costs which will eventually be passed on to investors 
(Gravelle, 2002). Also some firms make markets to obtain order-flow information which they exploit in 
subsequent trading. If increased transparency makes this information public, these firms will not have an 
incentive to make a market thereby decreasing liquidity (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980).  
The existing literature suggests a non-linear relationship between transparency and liquidity implying that 
some degree of transparency improves market liquidity but there is a point beyond which additional 
transparency may impair liquidity (Casey & Lannoo, 2004). This eventual trade-off between greater 
                                                  
1 In September 2005, the Financial Services Authority published a discussion paper seeking comments on transparency issues in 
the UK bond markets (FSA, 2005). The International Organization of Securities Commissions issued a report in May 2004 
asking member countries to assess the appropriate level of transparency in their corporate debt markets (IOSCO, 2004).  In April 
2005, The Bond Market Association released a paper discussing the implications of price transparency for European bond 
markets.  In its paper, The Bond Market Association urged regulators to examine the effect of transparency on liquidity before 
formulating policy with respect to increases in transparency (BMA, 2005). The Centre for European Policy Studies has also 
urged a “measured and deliberate action on the part of regulators” before they devise regulation to increase transparency in 
European bond markets (Casey and Lannoo, 2005, pg. 113). In Canada, the Canadian Securities Administrators recently 
extended the current exemption from transparency requirements for government securities until 31 December 2011. 2 
transparency and market liquidity for fixed income markets indicates that there is some optimal level of 
transparency and that full transparency may not be optimal. However, both the theoretical and empirical 
literature is not conclusive in further explaining the relationship between transparency and liquidity.  
The market microstructure literature suggests that the impact of greater transparency depends on the 
structure of a particular market (Gravelle, 2002; Financial Services Authority, 2005).  Most studies 
investigating the relationship between transparency and liquidity have focused on equity markets.
2 
However, as Gravelle (2002) notes, it is difficult to apply results obtained from equity studies to bond 
markets due to several differences between these markets. In addition, most previous studies on 
transparency in fixed-income markets have focused on the corporate and municipal bond sector. Also there 
have been no studies, to the best of our knowledge, which have considered the issue specifically for the 
Canadian marketplace. This paper adds to the literature by examining the impact of increased transparency 
on the liquidity of the Government of Canada bond market. 
 
Traditionally, bond markets have been opaque but recent regulatory initiatives in some jurisdictions have 
increased the level of post-trade transparency for corporate bonds.  In Canada, the Canadian Securities 
Administrators (CSA) introduced transparency rules for listed and unlisted corporate bonds in December 
2003 but exempted the government debt market (CSA, NI 21-101).3 In the United States, the TRACE 
initiative, launched in July 2002, increased the level of post-trade transparency for US corporate bonds.  
For government bond markets in the US and Canada, currently there is no mandated post-trade 
transparency but the market has developed initiatives to disseminate post trade information voluntarily. For 
instance, in Canada inter-dealer brokers provide, on a voluntary basis, trade information to CanPX for 
dissemination for actively traded government bonds in the wholesale market.  In the US, all voice-based 
interdealer bond brokers, except one, voluntarily provide trade information to GovPX for real-time 
dissemination
4 (International Organization of Securities Commissions, 2004). 
 
More recent technological innovations have contributed to increasing the level of pre-trade transparency 
(visibility of best bid and offer quotes) by encouraging the development of electronic trading platforms 
known as Alternative Trading Systems (ATSs).  In Canada three such platforms, CanDeal, Collective Bid 
                                                  
2 More recently there have been three studies investigating the impact of greater transparency in the US corporate bond market.   
3 The Canadian Securities Administrators recently extended the current exemption from transparency requirements for 
government securities until 31 December 2011. 
4 Even though disclosure on GovPX is not regulated, the system was initially developed under a regulatory threat by the SEC. 
The value of GovPX has dimished with the introduction of electronic trading platforms including BrokerTec and eSpeed.  3 
(CBID), and Bloomberg’s Bondtrader, have been operating since mid-2002.  All three systems are multi-
dealer to customer markets; however, the anonymous nature of CBID allows interdealer trading.
5   
 
The three systems came into operation at about the same time. CanDeal received approval to operate as an 
ATS in August 2002 with its first trade occurring on 10 September 2002.
6 CanDeal operates a Request for 
Quote (RFQ) system which displays indicative best bid and offer prices from a large number of dealers 
allowing institutional customers to request for firm quotes from four dealers simultaneously. CBID 
operates two platforms: a retail and an institutional platform. CBID received regulatory approval to operate 
its retail ATS in March 2002. It launched a separate market place for institutional trading in early July 2002 
making it the first institutional ATS in Canada (IDA, 2005). CBID operates an anonymous central order 
book where dealers and institutional investors directly enter their bid and offer prices. The platform 
displays the firm, executable best bid and offer quotes to all participants. Because the platform is 
anonymous, dealers can trade with other dealers and even customers can trade directly with other 
customers. In September 2004, CBID added Request for Quote trading for less liquid securities to its 
existing live, order-driven anonymous market. Bloomberg’s Bondtrader was officially launched in July 




The development of these electronic platforms has increased the level of pre-trade transparency in the 
Canadian fixed income market by making quote data available to institutional investors. Has this increase 
in transparency had an impact on liquidity? The increased transparency induced by the three platforms 
creates a natural experiment whereby we can assess the impact on liquidity. However, due to lack of data 
availability, we are unable to investigate the impact of these systems on the liquidity of dealer-customer 
markets. Nonetheless, data is available for the brokered interdealer market before and after the introduction 
of the three electronic systems.  
 
                                                  
5 A dealer to customer market enables institutional investors (e.g., pension funds, insurance companies, etc.) to trade with 
dealers.  
6 When first launched, the dealers on CanDeal included RBC Dominion, CIBC World Markets, TD Securities, Scotia Capital, 
National Bank Financial, and BMO Nesbitt Burns. Today all major dealers operating in Canada are providing liquidity on the 
CanDeal platform. 
7 The liquidity providers for the Bondtrader platform include JP Morgan Canada, HSBC Canada, Deutsche Bank, and Desjardins 
Securities. 4 
There is some evidence that the brokered interdealer and dealer-customer markets are linked. D’Souza, 
Gaa, and Yang (2003) state that “given the large and unpredictable inventory shocks typically faced by 
dealers in their trades with customers, interdealer debt markets have developed to facilitate inventory 
management and risk-sharing” (pg. 8). Also Bjonnes and Rime (2005) study the foreign exchange market, 
which like the fixed-income market has a decentralized multiple dealer structure, and find evidence that 
dealers use the interdealer market to manage positions from their customer business. In fact “access to 
customer orders is regarded as the most important source of private information” (Bjonnes & Rime, 2005, 
pg. 574). Furthermore, customers can view IDB screens and hence have access to quote information in the 
IDB market (even though only dealers are allowed to post quotes or trade in the IDB market). Hence it is 
plausible that an increase in pre-trade transparency in the dealer-customer market induced by fixed-income 
ATSs may have influenced liquidity in the IDB market.  
 
This paper tests this hypothesis, that is, what impact (if any) has the introduction of the electronic platforms 
had on the liquidity of the brokered interdealer market for the Government of Canada Bond market? We 
choose the government market for a number of reasons. First of all, the ATS exemption for government 
securities expires by the end of 2006.
8 As proposed by the Financial Services Authority (2005) and The 
Bond Market Association (2005), it is prudent to examine the relationship between transparency and 
liquidity before formulating policy with respect to transparency of government securities. Second, recent 
academic literature investigating the impact of increased transparency has focused on the corporate bond 
market. However, good quality information on government bond pricing is essential when pricing corporate 
issues as it provides a riskless benchmark yield curve.  
 
The results present some evidence of decreased bid-ask spreads in the months following the introduction of 
the three electronic platforms for the 30-year benchmark. Regression models which define liquidity as the 
dollar bid-ask spread, and control for factors such as macroeconomic news events, trading value, and 
volatility, indicate that bid-ask spreads were significantly narrower for the 30-year sector in the post-
transparency period. The results are similar when the price-impact coefficient (calculated by defining order 
flow as the value of buyer-initiated trades minus the value of seller-initiated trades) is used as a measure of 
depth. The bid-ask spread or the price-impact coefficient is not significantly different for any of the other 
benchmarks.  
                                                  
8 In Canada, the Canadian Securities Administrators recently extended the current exemption from transparency requirements for 
government securities until 31 December 2011. 5 
 
It is important to note that this paper is analyzing the impact of a change in the dealer-to-customer market 
on the inter-dealer market. Even though the two markets are linked, as discussed above, the test would have 
been stronger if it was possible to test the effect of the change in transparency in the dealer-to-customer 
market itself on the dealer-to-customer market. Furthermore, this paper examines the impact of a change in 
pre-trade transparency brought about by market innovation whereas the recent policy debates are more 
focused on the effect of post-trade transparency mandated by regulation. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the next section discusses previous literature; section 3 
describes the data set while section 4 explains the methodology; section 5 presents the results; and section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The academic debate over the effect of increased transparency on liquidity is on-going. Analysis of existing 
literature, however, seems to suggest that some degree of transparency improves market liquidity but 
beyond a certain point further increases in transparency may impair liquidity (Casey & Lannoo, 2004). This 
indicates that there is some optimal level of transparency and that full transparency may not be optimal. 
However, both the theoretical and empirical literature is not clear in further explaining the relationship 
between transparency and liquidity. 
  
2.1 Competing Hypotheses 
 
Intuitively it seems that greater transparency should lead to greater efficiency and higher liquidity. As 
Glosten (1999) states “increased transparency should lead to a greater commonality of information” (pg. 1). 
This should reduce the adverse selection problem and lead to faster incorporation of information and thus 
more efficient prices, and smaller spreads due to less fear of being picked off by informed traders (Glosten, 
1999).   
 6 
However, alternative theories suggest that a lack of transparency may lead to lower initial spreads because 
dealers compete to get order flow and use the information they acquire from the order flow to gain profits 
in subsequent rounds of trading (Glosten, 1999). As Grossman & Stiglitz (1980) note, traders who spend 
resources to gather information expect to be compensated for it and “the only way informed traders can 
earn a return on their activity of information gathering, is if they can use their information to take positions 
in the market which are ‘better’ than the positions of uninformed traders” (Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980, pg. 
404).  The ability to learn from trade and quote information can reduce the need to compete through prices 
(Bloomfield & O’Hara, 1999).   
 
Also, uninformed traders may prefer less transparent markets which allow them to “hide” their liquidity 
needs from the market (Bloomfield & O’Hara, 1999, pg.10). Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that 
speculative markets will be thinner if the “percentage of individuals who are informed is either near zero or 
near unity” (pg. 395). They claim that individual beliefs may be identical in one of two situations: (1) when 
all individuals are uninformed (which is the only possible equilibrium when there is very little noise in the 
price system and hence prices convey all information and there is no incentive to purchase information) or 
(2) when all individuals are informed (when costs of information are very low because for sufficiently low 
costs all uninformed individuals will desire to be informed). Since a major determinant of trade among 
individuals is differences in beliefs, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) contend that “when information is very 
inexpensive, or when informed traders get very precise information, then equilibrium exists and the market 
price will reveal most of the informed traders’ information” but “such markets are likely to be thin because 
traders have almost homogeneous beliefs” (pg. 404). There is therefore “a fundamental conflict between 
the efficiency with which markets spread information and the incentives to acquire information” (Grossman 
& Stiglitz, 1980, pg. 405).  
 
Most empirical studies investigating the relationship between transparency and liquidity have used equity 
market data. These studies suggest that transparency affects liquidity, trading costs, and the speed of price 








Madhavan, Porter, and Weaver (2005) study the effect of pre-trade transparency on the market by 
analyzing the natural experiment created when the Toronto Stock Exchange publicly disseminated the limit 
order book on both the traditional floor and on its automated trading system on 12 April 1990.  Since real-
time detailed information on the limit order book is publicly displayed simultaneously on both platforms, 
they are able to control for stock-specific factors as well as the type of trading system.  Their results 
suggest that the higher level of transparency achieved after the limit order book is publicly displayed does 
not improve market quality.  Rather an increase in transparency increases execution costs even after 
controlling for other factors and thus reduces liquidity and increases volatility (Madhavan, Porter, & 
Weaver, 2005).  
 
Boehmer, Saar, and Yu (2005) reach the opposite conclusion when they study pre-trade transparency by 
examining the January 2002 introduction of the New York Stock Exchange’s (NYSE) OpenBook service 
which allows off-exchange traders to observe depth in the limit order book in real time at each price level 
for all securities.  They find that effective spreads fall with the improvement in pre-trade transparency. 
They also find a higher cancellation rate, a shorter time-to-cancellation, and smaller limit orders after the 
increase in transparency.  They conclude that the increase in pre-trade transparency thus reduces spreads 
and improves certain dimensions of market quality (Boehmer, Saar, and Yu, 2005).  
 
Madhavan, Porter, & Weaver (2005) study the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX), whereas, Boehmer, Saar, 
and Yu (2005) analyze the NYSE which operates under a “specialist system” and has features of both 
order-driven and quote-driven markets9. Boehmer, Saar, and Yu (2005) believe that the conflicting results 
are not due to differences in market structure since Madhavan, Porter, and Weaver (2005) study the floor of 
the TSX that “features Registered Traders who are similar to specialists” (pg. 807). They attribute the 
conflicting results to developments “in information processing, order-handling, and trading technologies” 
                                                  
9 In an order-driven market (auction-agency market), buy and sell orders are brought together on the order book of the exchange 
and matched according to the exchange’s standard matching procedures. In a quote-driven market (dealer market), market 
makers (dealers) quote bid and ask prices and traders choose whether to buy or sell at the quoted prices. Under the NYSE’s 
specialist system, specialists match buy and sell orders on their order books (like an auction market). However, specialists are 
also obligated to provide liquidity to the market as market makers when orders disappear from one side of the market. They 
perform this function by quoting bid and ask prices and being ready at all times to transact at their quoted price (like a dealer 
market). 8 
(pg. 807) that occurred over the time frame between the two events studied, the TSX in 1990 versus the 
NYSE in 2002. 
  
Hendershott and Jones (2003) examine pre-trade transparency by investigating the effect of Island 
electronic communications network’s September 2002 decision to stop displaying its automated limit order 
book in three most active exchange-traded funds in response to regulatory enforcement.  They find that 
Island’s trading activity and price discovery falls and price discovery moves to the futures market.  Also as 
a result of zero transparency on Island, its effective and realized spreads increased when it went dark while 
effective and realized spreads decreased in other markets.  However, the increase in spreads on Island more 
than offsets the decrease in other markets, increasing overall trading costs and decreasing overall market 
quality (Hendershott & Jones, 2003).  
 
Gemmill (1996) analyzes the relationship between post-trade transparency and liquidity by studying block 
trades under different post-trade transparency regimes on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). There were 
three different regimes for the publication of last-traded prices (immediate publication, 24-hour delayed 
publication, and 90-minute delayed publication) on the LSE between October 1986 and January 1996. 
Gemmill (1996) finds that, contrary to arguments made by dealers, “delaying publication does not change 
block spreads and so does not improve liquidity” (pg. 1767). He finds that it is market volatility and not the 





Changes in transparency regimes are infrequent and as suggested by Glosten (1999) “hardly ever 
exogenous” (pg. 2).  This creates a challenge for developing a clear test with an exogenous change in 
transparency.  To overcome this difficulty, some researchers have proposed laboratory experiments for 
testing the theories.  When designing experimental markets, the researcher can control for factors other than 
transparency and thus isolate the effect of a change in transparency.  However, experimental designs vary 
in the degree to which they correspond to actual markets and the extent to which behavioral restrictions are 
imposed on the participants (Glosten, 1999). 
 9 
Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) design a laboratory experiment to study the effects of pre-trade and post-
trade transparency on spreads, price efficiency, and trader welfare.  Their experimental market uses humans 
and robots (computerized traders) to trade against two market makers (dealers) but does not allow dealers 
to trade with each other.  The trading session is divided into distinct trading rounds with trading taking 
place in three different settings with varying degrees of transparency (transparent, semi opaque, and 
opaque).  The results show that higher post-trade transparency results in greater informational efficiency of 
prices but also results in higher opening spreads, perhaps by reducing incentives for market makers to 
compete for order flow.  Spreads in later rounds are less affected by transparency because information is 
already contained in market prices and there is less benefit to capturing late round order flow.  They 
conclude that trade disclosure (post-trade transparency) benefits market makers at the expense of liquidity 
traders and informed traders.  They also find that pre-trade transparency (quote disclosure) has no visible 
effect on market performance. 
 
Flood et al (1999) also design a laboratory experiment to study the effects of market transparency but reach 
roughly opposite conclusions to Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999), namely that higher transparency results in 
lower spreads and higher trading value but less efficient prices (Flood, Huisman, Koedijk, & Mahieu, 
1999).  However, the differences in experimental design between the two papers make a direct comparison 
of results difficult.  For instance, the Flood et al (1999) market allows for pre-trade transparency (live 
quotes) only, and uses actual securities dealers as subjects as opposed to MBA students used by Bloomfield 
and O’Hara (1999).  Also the Flood et al (1999) market has seven market makers (dealers), allows dealers 
to trade with each other, and the trading session is continuous. 
 
2.3 Bond Market Research 
 
As stated previously, most empirical research investigating the impact of changes in transparency regimes 
on market liquidity have focused on equity markets. The theoretical research and experiments discussed 
earlier also construct equity market models. However, as Gravelle (2002) discusses, several differences 
between government bond markets and equity dealership markets may “make results garnered from the 
recent multiple-dealer equity research inapplicable to GS [government securities] markets” (pg. 2). The 
paper discusses three intrinsic differences between equity markets and government bond markets. First, 
equity market models are based on the assumption that a subset of investors has private information about 10 
the fundamental value of the security. Government securities, however, depend on the “term structure of 
the underlying risk-free interest rates” which in turn depends on “macroeconomic factors about which  
investors do not have private information” (pg. 3). Second, equity securities have an infinite maturity while 
government bonds have a finite term to maturity. Third, there are more instruments available to hedge 
government securities than equities. Thus, equity models are inappropriate for studying bid-ask spreads for 
government securities (Gravelle, 2002).  This section discusses studies investigating effects of different 
transparency regimes specifically for fixed-income markets. 
 
Municipal bonds:  
 
Green, Hollifield, and Schurhoff (2005) estimate measures of dealer bargaining power by analyzing trades 
between dealers and customers in municipal bonds. They use a sample collected by the Municipal 
Securities Rulemaking Board.  The data they study are made public after an initial time lag of one day for 
bonds that trade more than four times during a day and one month for all other trades.  Over the sample 
period though, the time lag is shortened in several steps thus creating a natural experiment to study the 
effect of increased transparency. Green, Hollifield, and Schurhoff (2005) cannot associate individual trades 
to specific dealers and have to infer them indirectly. They develop a theoretical model to decompose the 
dealer’s profits into a portion that reflects the dealer’s costs and a portion due to the dealer’s market power.  
Their results show that dealers’ market power is highest for small to medium sized transactions and the 
market power decreases with trade size.  
 
Harris and Piwowar (2004) design an econometric model to estimate transaction costs for a sample of U.S. 
municipal bond trades collected by the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB). They find that 
municipal bond trades are significantly more expensive for retail investors than institutional investors 
(average effective spreads of about 2 percent for retail trades of $20,000 versus 1 percent for institutional 
trades of $200,000).  They also find that municipal bond trading costs decrease with trades, do not depend 
on trade frequency, and are substantially more expensive than similar sized equity trades. They attribute 




In the U.S. the level of post-trade transparency increased significantly for corporate bonds when the 
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) launched the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine 11 
(TRACE) in July 2002.  Initially TRACE publicly disseminated information on 500 corporate debt 
securities including 50 high-yield bonds but over time additional groups of bonds were added. The 
structural change in post-trade transparency initiated by TRACE has provided researchers with the unique 
opportunity to investigate the impact of increased transparency.  
 
Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2006), commissioned by the NASD, perform a controlled experiment to 
investigate the impact of increased post-trade transparency on liquidity of the BBB bond market. Using 
TRACE data, the authors choose 90 BBB bonds for which the NASD began public dissemination in real-
time on 14 April 2003. They simultaneously match the 90 disseminated bonds on industry, trading activity, 
bond age, and time to maturity to construct a control sample of 90 non-disseminated bonds. The authors 
also select a separate matched-pair sample of 30 thinly traded BBB bonds that were publicly disseminated 
with a control sample of 30 bonds that were not disseminated.  
 
Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2006) use two different methods for calculating spreads. The first is a 
direct measure of the round-trip cost of trading a bond while the second is an estimate calculated by 
regressing the difference between the transaction price and a bid price on a dummy variable that equals one 
for customer buys and zero for customer sells.  The second method uses estimated rather than actually 
observed dealer bid prices (they use dealer bid prices reported by Reuters).  They find that the effect of 
transparency varies by trade size.  The results show that spreads decrease for bonds whose prices become 
transparent with the strongest impact on intermediate trade size.  However, they do not find any effect of 
transparency on the very thinly traded bonds (either positive or negative) and conclude that overall 
increased post-trade transparency has a neutral to positive impact on market liquidity as measured by an 
estimated bid-ask spread. They do not find any increase in daily trading value or number of transactions per 
day after the increase in transparency. 
 
Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2005) use TRACE data to investigate the effect of introducing price 
transparency on corporate bond transaction costs.  They estimate transaction costs using an econometric 
model, where the price at which the trade occurred is equal to the unobserved fundamental price of the 
bond, plus or minus a price concession that depends on whether the trade initiator was a buyer or a seller. 
The authors find that transaction costs are lower for transparent bonds than for similar opaque bonds and 
that transparency decreases investor transaction costs by roughly 5 basis points.  Their results suggest that 
retail investors benefit the most from enhanced transparency as the decline in transaction costs for bonds 12 
that are made TRACE-transparent is greater for small trades than for large ones and the cost of trading 
decreases significantly with trade size. Edwards, Harris, Piwowar (2004) also find that average transaction 
costs for corporate bonds (approximately 138 basis points) are considerably larger than for stocks (less than 
40 basis points).  The authors attribute this cost disparity across markets to differences in market structures, 
the most important one being transparency.   
 
Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2005) estimate trading costs for institutional trades in 
corporate bonds before and after the initiation of TRACE. They argue that this allows them to determine if 
transaction reporting and thus improved information for some bonds allows better valuation and hence 
quality than of other non-reported bonds. Their results support the argument since they find that trading 
costs decrease by 20% for non-TRACE-eligible bonds (average one-way reduction of 4 bps) and 50% for 
TRACE-eligible bonds (average one-way reduction of 6-7 bps). They conclude that transparency is 
important even for relatively sophisticated institutional investors. 
 
All three papers reach the conclusion that improved transparency has reduced transactions costs and thus 
not adversely affected liquidity as feared.
10  However, it is important to note some general caveats of this 
research. First,  there has been some criticism that these papers have not accounted for the broader changes, 
such as the growth of the credit derivatives market, that have taken place in recent years (Financial Services 
Authority, 2006).
11  In addition, TRACE data does not include the actual bid-ask spread and hence these 
studies use econometric models to indirectly estimate bid-ask spreads.12 Furthermore, the US corporate 
bond market is structurally different from the Canadian government bond market. For instance direct retail 
participation is much higher in the US corporate bond market than the Canadian government bond market. 
Hence, the TRACE experience in the US corporate bond markets may have little relevance for the 




                                                  
10 Although some anecdotal evidence from dealers suggests that TRACE has increased volatility and hampered liquidity 
particulalry in the high-yield market (BondWeek, 2005). 
11 Credit derivatives drive price formation in cash corporate bond markets and hence enable dealers to offer lower bid-ask 
spreads and improve liquidity and efficiency of cash markets. 
12 Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2006) also use a direct “dealer round trip” method to estimate spreads. It is, however, still an 
estimate of the actual spread. 
13 Financial Services Authority (2006) provides a detailed assessment of caveats associated with the TRACE literature. 13 
3. Data 
 
The CanPX dataset is used for this study for the period 25 February 2002 to 28 February 2003 for the 2-, 
5-, 10-, and 30-year benchmarks. The dataset has been previously used by D’Souza, Gaa, and Yang (2003) 
and D’Souza and Gaa (2004). Following D’Souza, Gaa, and Yang (2003), we define benchmark securities 
based on the Government of Canada’s issuance calendar.14   
 
Launched on 1 May 1999, CanPX consolidates the feeds of IDBs on one screen and displays the best bid 
and best ask price and yield quotes as well as the minimum size across all participating dealers for actively 
traded government bonds (D’Souza, Gaa, and Yang, 2003). CanPX data has the advantage that it contains 
both quote and trade information and includes bid-ask spreads (price and/or yield), the value offered and 
bid at each quote, whether the trade is buyer-initiated or seller-initiated, trade price, trade value, and broker 
identity. The four brokers during the sample period are Freedom International Brokerage Company, Prebon 
Yamane (Canada) Ltd., Shorcan Brokers Limited, and Tullet Liberty (Canada) Ltd. 
 
The raw data is downloaded from the CanPX screen each time the screen changes. This compilation 
procedure results in significant duplication (for instance, if the information on the screen changes for the 5-
yr benchmark bond, the entire screen is downloaded again including bonds for which the information 
remained unchanged). The data thus requires filtering prior to conducting tests. The initial filtering 
methodology is described in D’Souza, Gaa, and Yang (2003) Appendix A.
15   
 
In order to analyze the data, we follow D’Souza, Gaa, and Yang (2003) and divide each day into 144 
discrete 5-minute intervals from 6am to 6pm. For each bond, the quote data (ask price, value offered, ask 
yield, bid price, value bid, bid yield) reflects the most recently updated information over the interval. For 
trade information, trade value is calculated as the cumulative value traded within the interval (buyer-
initiated and seller-initiated), trade price is the volume-weighted average price for all trades within the 
interval, and trade frequency is the cumulative number of trades within the interval. We also keep a 
separate record for buyer-initiated trades and seller-initiated trades in order to construct measures of order 
flow.  
                                                  
14 The banchmark is “based on the final auction at which that security’s cumulative issuance crosses into the specified range of 
$7 to $10 billion for the 2-year sector, $9 to $12 billion for the 5-year sector, and $12 to $15 billion for the 10-year and 30-year 
sectors” (D’Souza, Gaa, and Yang, 2003). 
15 We found a few data-entry errors which were corrected. Details are available upon request. 14 
 
In order to obtain information on the total secondary Government of Canada bond market, we also 
download data from the Market Trade Reporting System (MTRS) database. The MTRS database, 
introduced in 2000 by the Investment Dealers Association (IDA) and the Bank of Canada, is “an automated 
interface for secondary market transactions in domestic bonds and money markets” (IDA, 2003). The 
reports include weekly data from Thursday to Wednesday. The MTRS database reports trading activity in 
Government of Canada bonds separately for banks, inter-dealer brokers, investment dealers, etc., as well as 
term to maturity (0-3 years, 3-10 years, over 10 years). However, data is not collected separately for 
benchmark securities so for instance, total trading in the 2-year benchmark is aggregated with all GoC 




Analyzing the impact of transparency on liquidity is particularly challenging because changes in a 
transparency regime are rare which makes it difficult to isolate the effect of a change in transparency. The 
task becomes even more challenging if different transparency regimes stretch over a long period of time, 
which makes isolating differences introduced by the passage of time especially difficult.  
 
The level of pre-trade transparency for the customer-to-dealer segment of fixed-income markets in Canada 
changed with the introduction of three electronic platforms in mid-2002. This created a natural experiment 
providing the opportunity to study the relationship between transparency and liquidity. Two of the ATSs, 
CBID and Bondtrader, began operations in July 2002 while CanDeal, the third and now the largest by 
dollar value traded, had its first trade in September 2002. Given the close proximity of the dates, it is not 
possible to isolate the effect of each individual system. Thus this study analyzes the combined impact of the 
three systems and does not attempt to isolate the effect of each different system.  
 
It is plausible that prices may change in anticipation of an event (Boehmer, Saar, Yu, 2003). Thus market 
prices may have changed following the regulatory approval of the ATSs (before they became fully 
operational). However, the three systems became operational soon after they received regulatory status 
(e.g., CanDeal received regulatory status in August 2002 and had its first trade on 10 September 2002). 
Also, pre-trade transparency increased only after the systems were operational and quotes became visible to 15 
subscribers. Thus this study defines the event period as the three months July, August, and September of 
2002.  In order to identify the liquidity effects of the change in pre-trade transparency, we measure liquidity 
before and after the event. The pre-event period is chosen as the four month period from the beginning of 
March to the end of June 2002. To give the market time to adjust to the changed transparency regime and 
reach an equilibrium state, we chose the post-event period as the five month period from the beginning of 
October 2002 to the end of February 2003. 16 
 




Measuring market liquidity, however, is complicated by the fact that it is a multi-dimensional concept. 
Usually liquidity comprises at least one of three dimensions including tightness, depth, and resiliency 
(D’Souza, Gaa, and Yang, 2003; CGFS, 1999; Kyle, 1985). Tightness is the cost of turning around a 
position over a short period of time. The most commonly used measure of tightness is the bid-ask spread17 
(Kyle, 1985; CGFS, 1999). Depth is the size of a transaction that can be absorbed without changing prices 
and it is usually measured by the number of orders on the order book at a given time (D’Souza, Gaa, and 
Yang, 2003; CGFS, 1999; Kyle, 1985). Resiliency is the speed with which prices recover from a random, 
uninformative shock (Kyle, 1985). There is no consensus on an appropriate measure for resiliency but it is 
considered useful since it measures potential market depth which cannot be observed from current order 
flow (CGFS, 1999).18  
 
Other measures have also been used as readily observable proxies of market liquidity. For instance, 
D’Souza, Gaa, and Yang (2003) propose a range of liquidity measures in addition to bid-ask spreads 
including  trading value, trade frequency, quote size, trade size, and price-impact coefficients. However, 
they find that bid-ask spreads and price-impact coefficients are the most appropriate measures of liquidity 
for the Government of Canada securities market (D’Souza, Gaa, Yang 2003). Therefore, in this study we 
                                                  
16 We also conduct robustness tests using different pre- and post- event periods and obtain similar results. 
17 There are several possible ways to measure the bid-ask spread including quoted spread, realized spread, and effective spread 
(see CGFS, 1999 for detailed definitions). 
18 Immediacy is another concept defined as “the time necessary to execute a trade of a certain size within a certain price range” 
but since it encompasses elements of the other three dimensions it is not “strictly speaking a separate dimension” (CGFS, 1999, 
pg. 13, footnote 5). 16 
use these two measures of liquidity and test the null that liquidity in the brokered interdealer market is 
unchanged before and after the introduction of the transparency enhancing ATSs. 
 
Previous bond studies have used econometric methods to estimate spreads because the data they used did 
not allow spreads to be measured directly (for example, TRACE data does not include pre-trade quote 
information and hence studies using this data have to develop models to estimate spreads). We are fortunate 
that the CanPX dataset used for this study includes both quote and trade data making it possible to directly 
measure the quoted spread. Our first measure of liquidity (tightness) is calculated as the difference between 






Order flow contains directional information and impacts prices and yields. For instance, a greater number 
of buyer-initiated trades versus seller-initiated trades are expected to put upward pressure on prices. One 
dimension of liquidity implies that a liquid market can absorb incoming orders without a huge impact on 
prices. Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) find that the effect of order flow on yields in the U.S. treasury market is 
strongest when liquidity is low, consistent with “market participants paying more attention to order flow 
when the subjective valuations are relatively uncertain (and liquidity is therefore low)” (pg. 2626). Thus a 
high price-impact coefficient implies reduced liquidity. We follow D’Souza and Gaa (2004) and calculate 
the price-impact coefficient (ß1), our second measure of liquidity, by using Kyle’s (1985) model and 
regressing log changes in bid/ask midpoint prices (Q) on one of two measures of order flow (OF) over a 5-
minute interval: 
 
Log (Qi,t) – log (Qi,t-1) = ß0 + ß1OFi,t + µi,t      (1.1) 
 
The first measure of order flow is calculated as the dollar value of buyer-initiated trades minus the value of 
seller-initiated trades cumulated over the 5-minute interval while the second measure is calculated as the 
number of buyer-initiated trades minus the number of seller-initiated trades over the 5-minute interval.  
 
Wider bid-ask spreads and higher price-impact coefficients imply reduced liquidity and indicate dealers’ 






As noted above, there are several factors other than transparency that impact liquidity. It is, therefore, 
imperative to control for these factors, which are discussed in this section: 
 
a.  Macro-news 
 
Macroeconomic news events and auctions greatly influence market liquidity for fixed-income securities. 
D’Souza and Gaa (2004) find a two-stage adjustment process to macroeconomic news announcements for 
the Government of Canada bond market. They only consider 8:30am Canadian and US news 
announcements19 and report that “in the first stage, bid/ask spreads widen in the 5-minute interval before 
and after an announcement”. In an extended second stage, price volatility, trading values, and trade and 
quote activity increase to higher-than-normal levels following the 8:30 a.m. macroeconomic news release, 
with statistically and economically significant effects persisting in some cases up to 25 minutes following 
the event…” (D’Souza and Gaa, 2004, pg. 18). Also, price-impact coefficients are significantly lower on 
announcements days in the 60 to 90 minute interval after the release of macro-news.  
 
They also report that “spreads are lower on auction days in the 5 to 10 minutes prior to an auction cut-off” 
and that “spreads widen after the auction cut-off time, and do not return to normal levels for up to two 
hours” (D’Souza and Gaa, 2004, pg. 17). For the sample period, bond auctions were held at 12:30 pm with 
results released at 12:45 pm before 9 December 2002 and 12:40 pm starting 9 December 2002 (D’Souza 
and Gaa, 2004). In order to control for macroeconomic news events and auctions, we limit regression 
analysis to the 10:10 am to 12:00 pm time period. That is, for each day in the pre- and post-event period, 
we only use the data in the 10:10 am to noon time frame when running the regression models. 
 
b.  Dollar Trade Value 
 
Dollar spreads are known to decrease with dollar value according to both asymmetric information and 
inventory control models of dealer behaviour (Madhavan, Porter, and Weaver, 2005; Boehmer, Saar, and 
                                                  
19 In Canada, all major economic data is released at 8:30am with the exception of CPI and Labor Force Survey released at 
7:00am, Housing Starts released at 8:15am and Ivey Purchasing Manager Index released at 10:00am.  18 
Yu, 2005).
20 In fact, there is such a strong correlation between trading volume and liquidity that trading 
volume is widely cited as a proxy for market liquidity and markets that have a relatively large amount of 
trading activity are considered to be the most liquid (D’Souza, Gaa, and Yang, 2003).  Therefore, in this 
paper we control for dollar trade value, defined as the total value of securities traded in the 10:10am to 
noon interval for each day.  
 
c.  Trade Volatility 
 
Inventory control and asymmetric information models of microstructure theory suggest that liquidity is 
negatively correlated with volatility. Dealers increase spreads during periods of increased volatility to 
decrease their risk of being caught on the wrong side of the trade. Thus spreads increase with return 
volatility (Madhavan, Porter, and Weaver, 2005; Boehmer, Saar, and Yu, 2005). We therefore include 
volatility as a control variable in the models analyzed in this study.  
 
There are several measures of volatility proposed in the literature including squared return, high-low 
measures (also known as range-based or extreme-value measures), standard deviation, and realized 
volatility.
 21  Since bonds are not traded as frequently as equities, we do not necessarily have a trade price 
for every 5-minute interval. Hence we decide against calculating realized volatility using intraday squared 
returns at 5-minute intervals. Instead we follow Madhavan, Porter, and Weaver (2005) and use standard 
deviation of trade price as a measure of volatility.22  
 
4.2 Model Specification 
 
The dependent variable is one of two measures of liquidity and the independent variables include the 
control measures of trade value, volatility, and a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the post-event 
period and 0 otherwise. This model specification is similar to the econometric specifications in Boehmar, 
                                                  
20 Microstructure theory suggests that order flow affects prices through two channels in a dealership structure. According to the 
asymmetric information model, dealers adjust price in response to order flow that may reflect private information. According to 
the inventory control model, dealers adjust price to control inventory fluctuation due to order flow (Lyons, 1995). 
21 Variance, square of standard deviation, is also used as a volatility measure but it is less stable and less desirable for computer 
estimation. Also standard deviation has the same unit of measure as the mean making it more convenient and intuitive than 
variance. 
22 We also run some of the models using the high-low measure used by Boehmer, Saar, and Yu (2005) and obtain similar results. 19 
Saar, and Yu (2005) and Madhavan, Porter, and Weaver (2005).  As stated earlier, we use two measures of 
liquidity. The first is the quoted bid-ask spread while the second is the price-impact coefficient. 
 
Model 1A – Pooled spread regression 
 
The first model is specified as: 
 
Si,t = a0 + a1Valuei,t + a2 Sigmai,t + a3 Post + µi,t         (1.2) 
 
where, Si,t is the quoted bid-ask spread for bond i in period t (daily measure using observations in the 




bid)/2}, Valuei,t is the trade value for bond i in 
period t, Sigmai,t is the volatility expressed as the standard deviation of trade price, and Posti,t is the 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the post-event period and 0 for pre-event observations. All 
benchmarks are pooled together in this model. This specification uses the constant coefficient or pooled 
regression model by assuming that there are neither significant security effects nor significant temporal 
effects in the panel data (so both the intercepts and slopes are constant). 
 
Model 2A – Dummy variable spread regression 
 
As stated earlier, this study examines four benchmark securities. Since bonds behave differently based 
solely on their term to maturity it is plausible that there is an unknown variable that differs between the four 
securities but is constant over time. If this unobserved variable is correlated with the explanatory variables 
in the above models then the least squares estimators will be biased and inconsistent due to the omitted 
variable (Greene, 2003). However, in such an instance a model may be employed which requires that the 
fixed effects be independent of the error terms but they may be correlated with the other explanatory 
variables (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004).  
 
We therefore specify a dummy variable regression and assume constant slopes but intercepts that differ 
according to the cross-sectional benchmark by using three dummy variables for the four benchmarks. This 
model is specified as: 
 
Si,t = a0 + a1Valuei,t + a2 Sigmai,t + a3 Post + a4 Mat5 + a5  Mat10 + a6 Mat30 + µi,t                 (1.3) 
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where, Si,t, Valuei,t, Sigmai,t, Posti,t are defined as above. Mat5 is 1 for the 5-year benchmark and 0 
otherwise, Mat10 is 1 for the 10-year bond and 0 otherwise, and Mat30 is 1 for the 30-year benchmark and 
0 otherwise. 
 
To further explore the results, we extend the above model by including interaction dummies and running 
the model specified as: 
 
Si,t = a0 + a1Valuei,t + a2 Sigmai,t + a3 Post + a4 Mat5 + a5 Mat10 + a6 Mat30 + a7 Post*Mat5 + a8 
Post*Mat10 + a9 Post*Mat30 + µi,t      (1.4) 
 
Model 3A – Benchmark spread regression 
 
In order to allow the intercepts and slopes to vary across the benchmarks, we run separate regressions for 
each security. Thus we specify the following four equations: 
 
S2t = a0 + a1Value t + a2 Sigmat + a3 Post + µt        (1.5) 
S5t = a0 + a1Value t + a2 Sigmat + a3 Post + µt    (1.6) 
S10t = a0 + a1Valuet + a2 Sigmat + a3 Post + µt   (1.7) 
S30t = a0 + a1Valuet + a2 Sigmat + a3 Post + µt    (1.8) 
  
where S2t, S5t, S10t, and S30t are the percentage quoted spreads in period t for the 2-, 5-, 10-, and 30-year 
benchmarks respectively.  
 
 
Model 1B – Pooled price-impact coefficient regression 
 
We also specify a two-step model where, in the first step, the price-impact coefficients are calculated using 
equation (1.1). In the second step the values for the coefficient ß1 are collected and used as a measure of 
liquidity instead of the percentage quoted spread. Hence, the model is specified as: 
 
PIi,t = a0 + a 1Valuei,t + a2 Sigmai,t + a3 Post + µi,t      (1.9) 
 
where, PIi,t is the beta coefficient collected from equation (1.1) for bond i in period t (daily measure estimated 
using 22 5-minute observations in the 10:10am to noon period), Valuei,t is the trade value for bond i in period t, 
Sigmai,t is the volatility expressed as the standard deviation of trade price, and Posti,t is the dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 for the post-event period and 0 for pre-event observations. Similar to 
model 1A, all the benchmarks are pooled together in this model as well. 
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Model 2B – Dummy variable price-impact coefficient regression 
 
Similarly we specify equation (1.3) and (1.4) using the beta coefficient collected from equation (1.1) as the 
dependent variable (PI i,t) instead of the percentage quoted spread.  
 
PIi,t = a0 + a1Valuei,t + a2 Sigmai,t + a3 Post + a4 Mat5 + a5  Mat10 + a6 Mat30 + µi,t      (1.10) 
PIi,t = a0 + a1Value i,t + a2 Sigmai,t + a3 Post + a4 Mat5 + a5 Mat10 + a6 Mat30 + a7 Post*Mat5 + a8 
Post*Mat10 + a9 Post*Mat30 + µi,t      (1.11) 
 
 
Model 3B – Benchmark price-impact coefficient regression 
 
Again in order to allow the intercepts and slopes to vary across the benchmarks, we repeat equations (1.5 to 
(1.8) using the price-impact coefficient (PIi,t) as the left-hand variable resulting in the following four 
equations: 
 
PI2t = a0 + a1Value t + a2 Sigmat + a3 Post + µt        (1.12) 
PI5t = a0 + a1Value t + a2 Sigmat + a3 Post + µt    (1.13) 
PI10t = a0 + a1Valuet + a2 Sigmat + a3 Post + µt   (1.14) 
PI30t = a0 + a1Valuet + a2 Sigmat + a3 Post + µt    (1.15) 
 
5. Results 
This section presents some descriptive statistics and univariate tests as well as the results for the regression 
models specified above. 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Figure 1 shows the weekly average bid-ask spread (dollar per $100 face value) over the entire CanPX day 
(6am to 6pm) from 26 February 2002 to 28 February 2003.  As expected, spreads widen with term to 
maturity, reflecting the greater market risk associated with longer maturity. The 2-year benchmark has the 
lowest spread and hence is the most liquid followed by the 5-year, 10-year, and 30-year sectors 
respectively. Figure 2 shows the weekly cumulative trading value ($ million) over the entire CanPX day 
(6am to 6pm) from 26 February 2002 to 28 February 2003.  The 2-year benchmark has the highest weekly 
trading value while the 30-year has the lowest.  
 22 
Figure 3 shows the weekly total trading value for all Government of Canada securities from 28 February 
2002 to 26 February 2003 using MTRS data. Figure 4 shows the weekly total trading value for benchmark 
securities on CanPX during the period 26 February 2002 to 24 February 2003.
23 The graphs show a 
somewhat similar pattern of trading.
24  
 
Table 1 shows the mean, median, and standard deviation for daily average bid-ask spread (dollar per $100 
face value), daily cumulative trading value ($ million), and total number of trades per day respectively over 
the entire CanPX day (6am to 6pm) from 26 February 2002 to 28 February 2003 for each of the sectors.  
 
The 2-year benchmark has the narrowest mean spread of $0.023 per $100 face value and the highest mean 
daily trading value of $472 million. The 10-year benchmark is traded more often than the 2-year and 5-year 
sectors but the cumulative dollar value traded for the 10-year benchmark is lower (mean trading value of 
$183 million versus $258 million for the 5-year). The 10-year benchmark is the most frequently traded 
sector with an average of 40 trades per day. The 2-year benchmark is traded on average 39 times per day 
followed by the 5-year sector with an average of 36 trades per day, and the 30-year benchmark with an 
average of 31 trades per day.  
 
Table 1 also shows the daily average price impact coefficients from 26 February 2002 to 28 February 2003 
for each of the benchmark bonds. The average daily price impact coefficient, calculated by using the value 
of buyer-initiated trades minus the value of seller-initiated trades as the measure of order flow, is the 
highest for the 30-year benchmark (0.27*10-4) and lowest for the 2-year bond (0.03*10-4). The average 
daily price impact coefficient, calculated by using the number of buyer-initiated trades minus the number of 





                                                  
23 The MTRS database collects weekly data from Thursday to Wednesday while the weekly CanPX data is cumulated from 
Tuesday to Monday.   
24 The graphs display decreased trading value for the first week of 2003 (four trading days between 2 - 7 January 2003) which 
reflects a seasonal effect. All tests are re-run excluding data for these days and results are consistent.  23 
5.2 Univariate Tests  
 
The mean dollar bid-ask spread, trade value, and trade frequency are presented in Table 2 for the pre- and 
post-transparency periods for each benchmark using 5-minute interval data for each day between 10:10am 
and noon. The pre-event period runs from 4 March 2002 to 28 June 2002 while the post-event period runs 
from 1 October 2002 to 28 February 2003. The table also presents the t-statistic for the test that the 
difference between the mean of pre- and post-transparency periods is zero for each of the variables. The 
null for the t-test is: 
Ho: mean(pre-event) – mean(post-event) = 0 
 
As the table shows the mean spread for the pre-event period for all benchmarks is $0.0623 (per $100 face 
value) while the mean spread for the post-event period is $0.0592 (per $100 face value). This difference is 
significant (t =3.38) at the one percent level suggesting that spreads are significantly narrower in the period 
following the introduction of the ATSs. However, the results for each benchmark show that the results are 
driven mostly by the 30-year benchmark. The average spread for the 30-year benchmark is lower at the one 
percent level of significance in the post-event period (t-stat =3.53 and average spread of $0.1089 in the 
post-event period versus $0.1010 in the pre-event period). The mean spread for the 10-year is significantly 
lower but only at the ten percent level with a t-stat of 1.8.  
 
The table also shows that the mean dollar trade value is lower in the post-event period at the five percent 
level (t = 2.23). Further investigation shows that trade value was significantly lower for the 5- and 10-year 
benchmarks only in the post-event period. There is no statistically significant difference in trade frequency 
(number of trades per 5-minute interval in the 10:10am to noon period) between the pre- and post- event 
periods for any of the benchmarks.
25 
 
Univariate tests were also conducted to determine if there was a significant change in the overall dollar 
trading volume, as measured by MTRS, for Government of Canada bonds before and after the introduction 
of the electronic platforms.  Table 3 presents the results of parametric and non-parametric tests for the pre-
event (28 February 2002 to 26 June 2002) and post-event (17 October 2002 to 28 February 2003) periods. 
The results show that the mean weekly total trading value in all Government of Canada securities is lower 
                                                  
25 Non-parametric tests, that do not rely on the assumptions that the variables are normally distibuted, were also conducted. The 
results are largely consistent with the parametric t-tests. 24 
in the post-event period ($70,760.04 million) than the pre-event period ($77,184.09 million). The 
difference, however, is not statistically significant as overall trading value for GoC bonds did not change 
significantly in the pre- and post periods.  
 
Overall, these tests show that spreads decreased significantly for the 30-year benchmark (one percent level) 
and the 10-year benchmark (ten percent level) after the introduction of the electronic platforms. Trade 
volume as measured by the dollar value ($ millions) was significantly lower for the 10-year benchmark 
(five percent level) and the 5-year benchmark (ten percent level) after the introduction of the platforms. 
Trade volume as measured by the frequency of trades was not significantly different for any of the 
benchmarks. This seems to support some of the arguments that increased transparency may reduce 
transaction costs but at the expense of decreasing the dollar value traded. It is important, however, to note 
that the above univariate tests do not control for other factors that impact liquidity. Hence it is difficult to 
attribute these results to the change in transparency regime. The next section presents the results of the 
various multivariate regression models developed in this study. 
 
5.3 Regression Results 
 
Table 4 provides the results for the regression equation (1.2). As the table shows the coefficient on the 
dummy is negative and significant at the 5% level (t = 2.25). This appears to suggest that even after 
controlling for macro-news, trade value, and price volatility, percentage bid-ask spreads are significantly 
lower in the post-event period. The table also shows that trade value and volatility are both significant 
variables as theory predicts. Higher value is associated with narrower spreads (negative coefficient) while 
an increase in volatility is associated with wider spreads (positive coefficient). 
 
However, results for the regression equation (1.4), also presented in Table 4, suggest that the above result 
of lower spreads in the post-event period is driven by the 30-year benchmark. To further verify this, 
equations (1.5) to (1.8) are run. The results for these separate regressions for each benchmark are presented 
in Table 5 and confirm that spreads narrowed in the post-event period for the 30-year benchmark only 
while spreads are not significantly different in the pre- and post-event periods for any of the other 
benchmarks. 
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The above equations are re-run using the price-impact coefficient as the dependent variable instead of 
percentage quoted spread. The results, presented in Table 6 and 7, are consistent with the above regressions 
and suggest that the price impact coefficient, calculated using value as a measure of order flow, decreased 
in the post-event period for the 30-year benchmark but is not statistically different for any of the other 
benchmarks. However, the price-impact coefficient calculated using frequency as a measure of order flow 




The introduction of three electronic trading platforms in mid-2002 increased the level of pre-trade 
transparency for fixed income securities in Canada.  This created a natural experiment providing the rare 
opportunity to study the impact of a changed transparency regime on liquidity. This paper uses detailed 
univariate tests and multivariate regression models to test the null hypothesis that liquidity for the brokered 
interdealer market remained unchanged before and after the introduction of the electronic platforms.  
 
This paper uses the bid-ask spread and the price-impact coefficient to measure liquidity. The results of the 
regression models indicate statistically lower bid-ask spreads in the post-event period for the 30-year 
benchmark with spreads for the other benchmarks remaining unchanged, suggesting that increased 
transparency had a neutral to positive impact on liquidity. 
 
It is important, however, to note several caveats before using the results to formulate policy. Firstly, the 
three systems were introduced at about the same time and hence it is not possible to isolate the impact of 
each system separately. Therefore, in this study, we assume that a single event brought about the change in 
transparency. As with all studies in the finance literature that investigate the impact of single events, it is 
statistically difficult to attribute the changes in liquidity to the single transparency-shifting event. 
Furthermore, even though efforts are made to control other factors, it is not possible to control all other 
factors that may also influence liquidity. This problem is further magnified since the event is assumed to 
occur over a three month period.  It is also particularly difficult to control factors that may be specific to a 
particular benchmark. Hence, it is plausible that a factor other than the changed transparency regime may 
have resulted in lowering the bid-ask spreads and price-impact coefficient for the 30-year benchmark. 
There are several factors that are specific to the 30-year benchmark and may be driving the results. One 26 
example is the increased demand for the 30-year benchmark in recent years from institutional investors, 
particularly pension funds, seeking to achieve cash-flow matching of their liabilities.
26 
 
It should also be noted that the actual benchmark bond issued over the sample period changed for all 
sectors except for the 30-year benchmark during the event period. For example, the 5-year benchmark was 
the Sep 06 (5.75%) from 25 February 2002 until the auction on 14 August 2002 when the September 07 
(4.75%) became the benchmark. Thus the pre- and post-periods use different bonds as benchmarks. We 
believe that this is not a major limitation since the post-period used starts in October giving the marketplace 
ample time to adjust to the benchmark change. We, therefore, assume that the bonds in the pre- and post-
event period behave in a similar fashion.  
 
In addition and more importantly, this paper is analyzing the impact of a change in the dealer-to-customer 
market on the inter-dealer market. Even though the two markets are linked, as discussed in an earlier 
section, the test would have been much stronger if it was possible to test the effect of the change in 
transparency in the dealer-to-customer market itself on the dealer-to-customer market.
27 It should also be 
noted that this paper examines the impact of a change in pre-trade transparency brought about by market 
innovation whereas the recent policy debates are more focused on the effect of post-trade transparency 




                                                  
26 Another may be the existence of futures markets for shorter maturity sectors. It has been argued that price formation for 
government bonds is driven by the associated futures markets (Financial Services Authority, 2006). Since futures markets are 
very transparent, it can be argued that due to arbitrage relations cash securites that have a related futures market will be exposed 
to some indirect transparency even before a change in transparency regime and any additional direct increase in transparency 
may not have any significant impact on the liquidity for these sectors. On the other hand, cash securities that do not have an 
associated futures market are more opaque and the direct incremental increase in transparency may have a significant impact on 
the liquidity for these securities. In Canada, there is no futures contract for the 30-year sector. For lower maturity contracts, there 
was an active market for the 10-year Government of Canada futures contract (CGB) during the sample period for this paper. The 
2-year Government of Canada futures contract (CGZ) was launched after the sample period but there was an active market for 3-
month Canadian Bankers’ Acceptance futures contracts (BAX). Bankers’ Acceptances (BAs) are short-term money market 
instruments with the payment of principal and interest guaranteed by one of Canada’s major banks. It is possible to trade a strip 
of consecutive 3-month BAX futures contracts maturing in successively deferred months in combination with a position in the 2-
year GoC benchmark. However, it should be noted that BAX contracts maturing many months in the future may not be very 
actively traded. 
27 There, however, is no data known to us that would allow such an analysis for the Government of Canada bond market. 27 
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Figure 1: Weekly Bid-Ask Spread 




































  Weekly average bid-ask spread from 26 February 2002 to 28 February 2003 
  Note: For ease of interpretation, the spread here is measured as (Pask – Pbid). The graph, however, was also plotted using 




bid)/2} and the picture remains largely unchanged. 
Figure 2: Weekly Trading Value 

































  Weekly cumulative trading value from 26 February 2002 to 28 February 2003 31 
Figure 3: Total Government of Canada Trading Value ($ million) 








































































































































Weekly cumulative trading value from 28 February 2002 to 26 February 2003 
 
Figure 4: Total Benchmark Trading Value on CanPX ($ million) 












































































































































Weekly cumulative trading value from 26 February 2002 to 24 February 2003 
  
* All tests are re-run to account for the seasonal effect for the first week of January 2003 32 
TABLE 1: Daily Descriptive Statistics 
 














Mean  0.023  472.15  39.26  0.0305  0.049 
Std. deviation  0.009  279.27  19.88  0.124  0.1161 
Median  0.022  443  39  0.0152  0.0469 
5 Year 
Mean  0.052  257.21  36.44  0.0793  0.0987 
Std. deviation  0.017  139.57  17.14  0.129  0.0787 
Median  0.051  237  35  0.0633  0.0944 
10 Year 
Mean  0.079  183.32  40.33  0.146  0.1333 
Std. deviation  0.024  100.65  18.85  0.241  0.1534 
Median  0.075  173.5  39  0.121  0.134 
30 Year 
Mean  0.113  80.83  30.59  0.274  0.1613 
Std. deviation  0.025  48.51  15.98  2.288  0.2541 
Median  0.113  71.75  29  0.222  0.1443 
1: The mean dollar spread (per $100 face value) is estimated as the average difference between the best bid and offer 
prices on each day between 6am and 6pm from 26 February 2002 to 28 Februaury 2003. 
2: The mean trade value ($ millions) is the average of the total value traded each day between 6am and 6pm from 26 
February 2002 to 28 February 2003. 
3: The mean trade frequency is the average of the total number of trades per day between 6am and 6pm from 26 
February 2002 to 28 February 2003. 
4: ß1* 10
-4 is estimated for each day by running the regression: Log (Qt) – log (Qt-1) = ß0 + ß1OF t + µt, where Qt is the 
midpoint of the bid-ask spread and OFt is the value of buyer-initiated trades minus the value of seller-initiated trades 
over each 5-minute interval between 6am and 6pm (144 intervals). The mean coefficient is the average of the daily 
estimates from 26 February 2002 to 28 Februaury 2003. 
5: ß1* 10
-3 is estimated for each day by running the regression: Log (Qt) – log (Qt-1) = ß0 + ß1OFt + µt, 
where Qt is the midpoint of the bid-ask spread and OFt is the number of buyer-initiated trades minus the 
number of seller-initiated trades over each 5-minute interval between 6am and 6pm (144 intervals). The 









TABLE 2: Univariate Analysis 
 
  All  2 Year  5 Year  10 Year  30 Year 
  mean  mean  mean  mean  mean 
Dollar Spread
1 
Pre-event  0.0623  0.0194  0.0454  0.0747  0.1089 
Post-event  0.0592  0.0193  0.0446  0.0717  0.1010 
T-statistic
a  3.38*  0.07  0.79  1.80+  3.53* 
Dollar Trade Value
2 
Pre-event  10.927  19.393  12.028  7.508  3.780 
Post-event  9.629  18.084  9.783  6.404  4.320 
T-statistic
a  2.23**  0.73  1.92+  2.0**  -1.54 
Trade Frequency
3 
Pre-event  1.41  1.42  1.40  1.43  1.36 
Post-event  1.43  1.44  1.41  1.44  1.42 
T-statistica  -0.90  -0.48  -0.15  -0.07  -1.28 
1: The mean dollar spread (per $100 face value) is estimated as the average difference between the best bid 
and offer prices for each 5-minute interval between 10:10am and noon for the pre-event and post-event 
periods. 
2: The mean dollar trade value ($ millions) is the total value traded for each 5-minute interval between 
10:10am and noon for the pre-event and post-event periods. 
3: The mean trade frequency is the total number of trades for each 5-minute interval between 10:10am and 
noon for the pre-event and post-event periods. 
a: Ho: mean(pre-event) - mean(post-event) = 0; + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. 





TABLE 3: MTRS Univariate Analysis 
The table reports the mean, standard deviation, and rank sum of the weekly total Government of Canada trading 
value ($ million) for the periods before and after the introduction of electronic platforms. The pre-event period runs 











Trade Value             
Mean  77184.09  70760.04  0.9644    
Std. Deviation  15172.49  23395.39  0.3417    
Rank Sum  326.00  340.00     0.133 
Obs  17  19     0.7156 
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TABLE 4: Spread regression estimates 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Value (a1)  -0.0000018  -0.0000003  -0.0000003 
  (7.77)*  (3.67)*  (3.44)* 
Sigma (a2)  0.0023036  0.0005357  0.0005423 
  (6.11)*  (4.02)*  (3.96)* 
Post (a3)  -0.0000548  -0.0000488  -0.0000133 
  (2.25)**  (3.03)*  (1.00) 
Mat5 (a4)    0.0002088  0.0002082 
    (16.04)*  (11.34)* 
Mat10 (a5)    0.0004359  0.0004423 
    (22.84)*  (17.51)* 
Mat30 (a6)    0.0007799  0.0008596 
    (25.74)*  (17.53)* 
Post*Mat5 (a7)      0.0000027 
      (0.11) 
Post*Mat10 (a8)      -0.0000097 
      (0.30) 
Post*Mat30 (a9)      -0.0001417 
      (2.59)* 
Constant (a0)  0.0006255  0.0002509  0.0002289 
  (19.00)*  (16.13)*  (18.38)* 
Observations  675  675  675 
R-squared  0.3092  0.7029  0.7093 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
             Pre-event period = 4 March 2002 to 28 June 2002. Post-event period = 1 October 2002 to 28 February 2003. 
 
(1): Si,t = a0 + a1Value i,t + a2 Sigmai,t + a3 Post + µi,t 
(2): Si,t = a0 + a1Value i,t + a2 Sigmai,t + a3 Post  + a4 Mat5 + a5  Mat10 + a6 Mat 30 + µi,t                  
(3) : Si,t = a0 + a1Valuei,t + a2 Sigmai,t + a3 Post + a4 Mat5 + a5 Mat10 + a6 Mat30 + a7 Post*Mat5 + a8 
Post*Mat10 + a9 Post*Mat30 + µi,t 
 





bid)/2} for each each interval between 10 :10am and noon in the pre- and post-event period for each benchmark i. 
Value i,t: is the total value traded between 10 :10am and noon in the pre- and post-event period for each benchmark i. 
Sigmai,t: is the intra-interval volatility calculated as the standard deviation of trade price for the twenty two 5-minute 
interval observations between 10 :10am and noon in the pre- and post-event period for each benchmark i. 
Post: takes the value of 1 for the post-event observations; 0 otherwise. 
Mat5: takes the value of 1 for the 5 Year benchmark; 0 otherwise. 
Mat10 : takes the value of 1 for the 10 Year benchmark; 0 otherwise. 
Mat30 : takes the value of 1 for the 30 Year benchmark; 0 otherwise. 
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TABLE 5: Spread benchmark regression estimates  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Value (a1)  -0.0000001  -0.0000001  -0.0000012  -0.0000033 
  (1.78)+  (0.60)  (4.38)*  (3.85)* 
Sigma (a2)  0.0022648  0.0003746  0.0004890  0.0007236 
  (3.95)*  (1.10)  (3.23)*  (2.86)* 
Post (a3)  -0.0000096  -0.0000086  -0.0000244  -0.0001325 
  (0.76)  (0.42)  (0.84)  (2.50)** 
Constant (a0)  0.0001782  0.0004294  0.0007231  0.0011385 
  (14.85)*  (17.56)*  (25.16)*  (19.99)* 
Observations  168  173  173  161 
R-squared  0.0815  0.0113  0.1063  0.1182 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
          Pre-event period = 4 March 2002 to 28 June 2002. Post-event period = 1 October 2002 to 28 February 2003. 
 
(1): S2t = a0 + a1Valuet + a2 Sigmat + a3 Post + µt 
(2): S5t = a0 + a1Valuet + a2 Sigmat + a3 Post + µt 
(3): S10t = a0 + a1Valuet + a2 Sigmat + a3 Post + µt 
(4): S30t = a0 + a1Valuet + a2 Sigmat + a3 Post + µt 
 
S2t, S5t, S10t, and S30t: are the percentage quoted spreads in period t for the 2-, 5-, 10-, and 30-year benchmarks 
respectively. 
Value t: is the total value traded between 10 :10am and noon in the pre- and post-event period for each benchmark. 
Sigmat: is the intra-interval volatility calculated as the standard deviation of trade price for the twenty two 5-minute 























TABLE 6: Price-impact coefficient regression estimates  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 





  (4.70)*  (4.27)*  (3.61)*  (3.49)* 
Sigma (a2)  0.000231017  0.000568421  0.000120968  0.000122473 
  (2.46)**  (1.83)+  (1.21)  (1.26) 
Post (a3)  -0.000017675  -0.000018647  -0.000017235  0.000001556 
  (2.46)**  (1.32)  (2.46)**  (0.66) 
Mat5 (a4)      -0.000003166  0.000000993 
      (0.76)  (0.26) 
Mat10 (a5)      0.000022211  0.000016921 
      (3.13)*  (2.12)** 
Mat30 (a6)      0.000043648  0.000089856 
      (3.49)*  (4.08)* 
Post*Mat5 (a7)        -0.000006878 
        (1.11) 
Post*Mat10 (a8)        0.000010627 
        (0.80) 
Post*Mat30 (a9)        -0.000083268 
        (3.41)* 
Constant (a0)  0.000039386  0.000124550  0.000023439  0.000011947 
  (4.92)*  (5.96)*  (4.20)*  (3.14)* 
Observations  668  626  668  668 
R-squared  0.0624  0.0613  0.0925  0.1314 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
Pre-event period = 4 March 2002 to 28 June 2002. Post-event period = 1 October 2002 to 28 February 2003. 
 
(1): PIvali,t = a0 + a 1Value i,t + a 3 Sigmai,t + a 4Post + µi,t 
(2): PIfreqi,t = a0 + a 1Valuei,t + a 3 Sigmai,t + a 4Post + µi,t 
(3): PI vali,t = a0 + a1Valuei,t + a2 Sigmai,t + a3 Post + a4 Mat5 + a5  Mat10 + a6 Mat30 + µi,t    
(4) : PIvali,t = a0 + a1Valuei,t + a2 Sigmai,t + a3 Post + a4 Mat5 + a5 Mat10 + a6 Mat30 + a7 Post*Mat5 + a8 
Post*Mat10 + a9 Post*Mat30 + µi,t   
PIvali,t: is the price impact coefficient (ß1) obtained from the regression: Log (Qi,t) – log (Qi,t-1) = ß0 + ß1OFi,t + µi,t, where, 
Qi,t is the average midpoint of the bid-ask spread for each 10:10am to noon interval for the pre - and post-event periods for each 
benchmark i, and OF i,t is the value of buyer-initiated trades minus the value of seller-initiated trades over each 5-minute interval 
between 10:10am and noon (22 intervals). 
PIfreqi,t is the price impact coefficient (ß1) obtained from the regression: Log (Qi,t) – log (Qi,t-1) = ß0 + ß1OFi,t + µi,t, where, 
Qi,t is the average midpoint of the bid-ask spread for each 10:10am to noon interval for the pre - and post-event periods for each 
benchmark i, and OFi,t is the number of buyer-initiated trades minus the number of seller-initiated trades over each 5-minute 
interval between 10:10am and noon (22 intervals). 
Valuei,t: is the total value traded between 10 :10am and noon in the pre- and post-event period for each benchmark i. 
Sigmai,t: is the intra-interval volatility calculated as the standard deviation of trade price for the twenty two 5-minute interval 
observations between 10 :10am and noon in the pre- and post-event period for each benchmark i. 
Post: takes the value of 1 for the post-event observations; 0 otherwise. 
Mat5: takes the value of 1 for the 5 Year benchmark; 0 otherwise. 
Mat10 : takes the value of 1 for the 10 Year benchmark; 0 otherwise. 
Mat30 : takes the value of 1 for the 30 Year benchmark; 0 otherwise. 37 
TABLE 7: Price-impact coefficient benchmark regression estimates  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 





  (0.46)  (0.06)  (3.32)*  (2.55)** 
Sigma (a2)  0.000012373  -0.00007662  0.000130096  0.000195437 
  (0.24)  (0.54)  (0.77)  (1.39) 
Post (a3)  0.00000104  -0.0000047  0.00001105  -0.0000735 
  (0.61)  (0.89)  (0.87)  (3.22)* 
Constant (a0)  0.000001353  0.000012683  0.000052085  0.000117582 
  (0.49)  (2.01)**  (3.60)*  (4.43)* 
Observations  166  173  171  158 
R-squared  0.0033  0.0070  0.0844  0.1100 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
         Pre-event period = 4 March 2002 to 28 June 2002. Post-event period = 1 October 2002 to 28 February 2003. 
 
(1): PIval2t = a0 + a  1Valuet + a 3 Sigma t + a  4Post + µt 
(2): PIval5t = a0 + a  1Valuet + a 3 Sigma t + a  4Post + µt 
(3): PIval10t = a0 + a 1Value t + a 3 Sigmat + a  4Post + µt 
(4): PIval30t = a0 + a 1Value t + a 3 Sigmat + a  4Post + µt 
 
PIvali,t: is the price impact coefficient (ß1) obtained from the regression: Log (Qi,t) – log (Qi,t-1) = ß0 + ß1OFi,t + 
µi,t, where, Qi,t is the average midpoint of the bid-ask spread for each 10:10am to noon interval for the pre- and post-
event periods for each benchmark i, and OFi,t is the value of buyer-initiated trades minus the value of seller-initiated 
trades over each 5-minute interval between 10:10am and noon (22 intervals). 
Valuei,t: is the total value traded between 10 :10am and noon in the pre- and post-event period for each benchmark i. 
Sigmai,t: is the intra-interval volatility calculated as the standard deviation of trade price for the twenty two 5-minute interval 
observations between 10 :10am and noon in the pre- and post-event period for each benchmark i. 





    